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Both Britain and Germany participated in aerial bombing initiatives in the Second 
World War. Germany developed its bombing technique after a failed attempt to 
invade Britain using the cooperative land, sea, and air Blitzkrieg method, resorting 
to bombarding the opponent with aerial power instead. Britain engaged in 
retaliatory bombings on Germany. Both nations targeted cities dense with civilian 
populations to crush morale while disguising this controversial motive by 
attempting to strike at strategic points to hinder enemy advancement as well. As 
Blitzkrieg regressed into a campaign of aerial terror in British airspace, Britain’s 
bombing initiative evolved into the firebombing of Germany. Neither effort was 
especially helpful or efficient considering the entire war as they were both 
insufficiently supported by other military campaigns to be a key factor of either 
country’s advancement. 
 
 
Among the damage and tension that remained throughout Europe after the First 
World War, nations were attempting to rebuild their countries and reconstruct their 
defenses. When another war did come only 21 years later, both sides were equally 
unprepared. The Second World War began in 1939 with a sitzkrieg, no overt 
aggression from any participating nations; Britain was obtaining supply agreements 
and Germany was strategizing its first offensive. The Allies were less prepared for 
war due to the economic collapse resulting from the Great Depression in the 
interwar period. At the same time, Germany was able to build up its military power 
through its disobedience of the Versailles Treaty coupled with appeasement from 
Allied countries. Because the Allies had focused on restoring their economies, 
Germany took advantage of the chance to build up its military strength and strategy. 
Germany had developed a tactic called blitzkrieg that utilized strategic and 
technological advancements that had been made through the First World War and 
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the industrious 1920s. Blitzkrieg consisted of extreme military cooperation as 
airpower would support both ground troops and heavy artillery in a swift, pointed 
offensive.1 This strategy “intended to leave an enemy psychologically dazed and 
disorganized”.2 Blitzkrieg’s most notable aspect was its heavy reliance on aerial 
attacks. The attacks set the stage for Germany and Britain’s mutual bombing 
initiatives that transitioned from tactical, targeted attacks to morale-crushing “city 
busting”.3 Britain, after experiencing the effects of this aerial-only technique 
firsthand on Germany’s account, adopted it from the enemy; when it was used on 
its own, it quickly devolved on both sides into a spectacle of firepower and 
resources rather than a depiction of effective advancement.  
 
Germany’s successful implementation of blitzkrieg in 1940 ended the sitzkrieg and 
led to Axis occupation of the Netherlands, Belgium, and France.4 Britain was left 
extremely vulnerable to a direct German attack.5 As Germany conquered the north 
of France, Allied troops were cornered at Dunkirk. To prove the significance of the 
German Luftwaffe and destroy British morale, Germany opted to counter any 
Allied evacuation attempt using only airpower.6 Though the Luftwaffe was 
unsuccessful in stopping the evacuation or demoralizing Britain, its presence 
demonstrated the growing importance of aerial warfare in the Second World War. 
Germany’s next plan to advance across the English Channel and into Britain was 
dubbed Operation Sea Lion; it necessitated the substantial use of the Luftwaffe to 
clear a path for the implementation of blitzkrieg.7 Though the Luftwaffe far 
outnumbered the Royal Air Force (RAF) and targeted their bases in an attempt to 
gain total control of the airspace during the Battle of Britain, the RAF was 
extremely determined in fighting off the enemy and won the Battle, thwarting 
Operation Sea Lion.8 However, Britain’s victory did not stop the Luftwaffe from 
commencing bombing initiatives on London, known as the Blitz.9 Not only were 
RAF resources, factories, and the city of London targeted, but later on, industrial 
cities like Coventry and provincial cities like Canterbury were hit hard to destroy 
war production and Allied morale, respectively.10, 11 Britain was in need of an 
offensive tactic to successfully counter the continuous, widespread German 
bombings. 
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In response to the many blitzes that Britain had to endure, Britain assigned its 
Bomber Command to commence its own retaliatory blitzing initiatives on Germany 
to destroy German morale and war industry while supporting Allied advancement. 
Britain was greatly affected by the bombings that targeted the nation’s civilian 
populations and its citizens insisted on retribution. Considering the bombing of 
Dresden specifically, Britain chose the city as a target because it served as a refuge 
for civilians escaping the destruction of the Russian advancement.12 Britain 
explicitly sought to demoralize the Germans while also improving its own citizens’ 
morale by satisfying their demand for revenge.13 Even so, this type of “morale 
bombing” brought up an ethical dilemma often hidden under the tactical reason of 
bombing to hinder Germany’s war production, much like what Germany’s initial 
goal was in the Battle of Britain. Again using Dresden as a primary example, the 
city’s large consumer industry had been reassigned the task of war production.14 
Dresden was also considered a central communications zone and transport location 
for the German Wehrmacht.15 In terms of targeting civilian populations, due to the 
cities’ critical features, Britain’s area bombing was often portrayed as a strategic 
endeavour to halt both German supplies and troops from reaching the front lines to 
advance. Britain’s bombing was also motivated by aiding Russia’s westward 
advancement in Germany’s two-front war. Britain’s Joint Intelligence Sub-
Committee suggested that Russia’s involvement was crucial to ending the war as 
quickly as possible and that attacks on eastern German cities, including Dresden, 
could aid the ally while creating chaos and confusion between refugees and troop 
movement behind German lines.16 Britain considered the mission of its Bomber 
Command as pivotal to destroying German morale and military efforts while also 
directly furthering the Allied agenda. Germany’s blitzkrieg tactics in English 
airspace had greatly influenced the future of Britain’s course of strategic action in 
the war as large-scale area bombing became the preferred method of destruction. 
 
The Battle of Britain demonstrated the necessity for RAF involvement in Allied 
defense, but the relentless bombings afterwards in both Britain and Germany 
showed the tactical aerial aspect of blitzkrieg regress into the madness of area 
bombing. Fearful of another drawn-out war like the one only a quarter century ago, 
the concept of total war consumed the minds of Allies and Axis alike as constraints 
and ethics surrounding aerial targeting had weakened.17 Thinking from the 
perspective of total war, “incendiary bombs [which] were indiscriminate regarding 
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specific targets . . . became the weapon of choice for widespread destruction.”18 In 
response to the Coventry bombings, Britain struck the German city of Mannheim, 
largely populated by civilians.19 When it came to “morale bombing”, Britain had 
perfected the strategy that Germany had introduced and used it in unison with other 
Allied efforts.20 However, the RAF and Bomber Command suffered extreme losses 
in their effort to stop German advancement.21 Due to total war, the area bombing 
increased in intensity in the last years of the Second World War.22 Coupled with 
American aerial power that targeted war industry, the effects of the raids were 
proportionate and noticeable, but Bomber Command’s solo efforts were physically 
ineffective.23 The firebombing of Dresden took place in the last year of the war for 
the three reasons mentioned previously, but the destruction of Dresden itself did 
not accomplish much for the Allies, like most other area bombings that Britain 
initiated. It cost Britain lives and resources that could have served more 
productively elsewhere.24 Dresden was referred to by Churchill himself as “mere 
acts of terror and wanton destruction”25 and raised questions of morality that were 
to be explored and revamped in the style of American military-objective targeting 
if the war had gone on longer. Aside from the mostly insignificant nature of the 
Dresden firebombings regarding Allied victory, Dresden and similar Bomber 
Command missions raised concerns over ethics and morality that overshadowed 
any headway the efforts did achieve. Considering the large scope of the area 
bombings, Britain did accomplish some destruction of German wartime industry. 
However, the primary goal for the attacks was retribution for German attacks on 
Britain, as proven by the cities and civilians targeted. The bombings did contribute 
to some amount of Allied advancement when they were paired with Allied ground 
troops and American aerial support, but the precision of the blitzkrieg strategy that 
is so crucial for its success disintegrated in favour of retaliation. Instead of using 
the strategy to quickly overcome the enemy, it was extensively modified and, in 
turn, perpetuated the devastating effects of total war. 
 
After Germany’s showcase of power in 1940 to end the sitzkrieg, Britain was in 
need of effective strategies to overcome Germany’s advancement. Germany’s 
adaptation of blitzkrieg once Operation Sea Lion was cancelled dominated the 
aerial warfare practices of both Axis and Allies for the duration of the war. The 
precision tactic transformed into large-scale area bombings that served the 
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controversial purpose of crushing morale rather than destroying critical resources. 
Both sides performed “city busting” attacks on the other: Germany in Britain and 
Britain in Germany.26 German targeting of city centers in London and other 
populated areas under English skies encouraged Britain to reciprocate the actions, 
and Britain proceeded by initiating firebombing raids in both industrious and 
provincial German cities. Once the strategy deviated from traditional blitzkrieg, it 
proved much less efficient and served the purpose of terrorizing rather than 
advancing the war. Only when area bombing was supported by ground troops and 
strategy-oriented aerial targeting, as blitzkrieg dictates, was there a chance of 
achievement, proven by Russia’s advancement westward into Germany. The RAF 
was able to defend itself during the Battle of Britain when attacked only by the 
Luftwaffe, so naturally, an area-bombing-only campaign would not succeed in 
Germany either, explaining the need for further Allied support. Britain realized this 
by the end of the war, after Dresden, as the ethics of area-bombing and population 
targeting were finally addressed. However, support from other Allies had already 
proven to be enough in defeating Germany as the war ended only six months after 
the devastating attacks on Dresden.  
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